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1.  Introduction
	 In	recent	years,	with	the	rapid	development	of	information	economics,	corporate	finance	theory,	and	financial	
intermediation	theory,	the	investigation	of	the	impact	of	financial	factors	on	the	macroeconomy	has	been	a	thriving	
research	field,	and	great	progress	has	been	achieved.	In	the	growing	literature,	the	credit	view,	which	is	based	on	
financial	market	 imperfections	and	 focuses	on	 the	 role	of	 credit	 in	monetary	 transmission	and	economic	
fluctuations,	has	won	greater	appreciation.1
	 The	credit	view	emphasizes	the	special	role	of	banks	and	the	importance	of	credit	by	taking	imperfection	
factors,	such	as	asymmetric	information,	incomplete	contracting	and	heterogeneity	among	economic	agents	into	
account.	According	to	this	view,	credit	is	not	as	simple	as	just	the	supply	of	funds.	Essentially,	it	is	information–
intensive,	involving	information–acquiring	activities	performed	by	banks	(such	as	ex	ante	screening	and	ex	post	
monitoring),	specialized	knowledge	(know–how)	needed	in	such	information–related	activities,	 the	relationship	
between	banks	and	borrowers,	 etc.	This	characteristic	of	 credit	 ameliorates	 the	problems	 stemming	 from	
information	friction	and	facilitates	 the	 flow	of	 funds	 into	macroeconomic	activities.	 In	 the	credit	view	it	 is,	
therefore,	argued	that	credit	has	an	important	influence	on	the	macroeconomy.	I	provide	a	schematic	diagram	of	the	
credit	view	in	Figure	1.	
	 In	 this	paper,	by	 reviewing	 the	 literature	concerning	 the	credit	view	I	 illustrate	 the	 framework	and	
implications	of	the	credit	view	and	point	out	some	issues	under–explored	there.	I	also	present	a	bank	behavior	
model	in	which	information–acquiring	costs	are	incorporated,	aiming	to	build	a	micro–foundation	for	the	credit	
view	from	the	viewpoint	of	bank	lending	behavior.	
	 The	rest	of	this	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	presents	a	review	of	the	role	of	credit	in	the	monetary	
transmission	mechanism.	Section	3	offers	a	review	of	the	links	between	credit	and	economic	fluctuations.	Section	4	
describes	the	bank	behavior	model.	Section	5	gives	concluding	remarks.	
2.  Credit and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
	 In	the	money	view,	the	conventional	view	of	the	monetary	transmission	mechanism,	it	has	been	asserted	that	
monetary	policy	exerts	 its	 influence	on	real	economic	activity	 through	changing	 the	money	supply	and	 thus	
1　In	Boivin	et al.	(2011),	the	credit	view	is	understood	as	the	name	of	non–neoclassical transmission mechanisms	involving	market	imperfections	
in	credit	markets.
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affecting	interest	rates.	With	the	complete–market	setup,	the	money	view	ignores	financial	intermediation	and	the	
information–acquiring	activity	performed	by	banks.
	 By	contrast,	allowing	for	market	imperfections,	the	credit	view	describes	a	different	perspective	of	monetary	
transmission	––	the	credit	channel	hypothesis	(see	Route	1	in	Figure	1).	According	to	this	view,	monetary	shocks	
cause	changes	in	the	net	worth	of	borrowers	through	a	channel	called	the	“balance	sheet	channel”.	For	example,	
borrowers’	 interest	expenses	will	 increase	and	asset	values	will	 shrink	due	 to	an	 increase	 in	 interest	 rates.	
Meanwhile,	monetary	shocks	have	effects	on	the	lending	ability	of	commercial	banks	through	a	channel	called	the	
“bank	lending	channel”	as	well.	For	example,	due	to	open	market	sales	or	an	increase	in	the	required	reserve	ratio,	
the	loanable	funds	of	banks	will	be	drained2.	Hence,	borrowers’	external	financing	costs	and	availability	of	bank	
loans	will	be	affected	significantly	by	monetary	policy.	The	credit	channel	hypothesis	in	the	credit	view	suggests	
that,	by	affecting	borrowers’	external	financing	costs	and	availability	of	credit	through	the	balance	sheet	channel	
and	the	lending	channel,	monetary	policy	will	have	a	far–reaching	impact	on	aggregate	economic	variables	such	as	
investment,	employment,	and	output3.	
	 Bernanke	and	Blinder	(1988),	one	of	 the	pioneering	works	of	 the	credit	channel	hypothesis,	 illustrates	
theoretically	that	monetary	policy	not	only	affects	the	short–term	interest	rate,	but	also	has	a	direct	influence	on	
credit	supply,	and	that	the	effect	of	monetary	policy	including	this	influence	is	stronger	than	that	which	is	implied	
by	the	conventional	IS–LM	model.	As	for	 the	evidence	supporting	the	credit	channel	hypothesis,	an	extensive	
literature	has	empirically	 identified	the	existence	of	a	credit	channel	of	monetary	policy	transmission	(see,	for	
example,	Bernanke	and	Blinder	[1992],	Gertler	and	Gilchrist	[1993,	1994],	Kashyap	et al.	 [1993],	Hoshi	et al.	
[1993]).	
	 It	 is	 interesting	to	ask	here	whether	the	lending	behavior	of	banks	would	always	comply	with	monetary	
policy.	I	believe	that	this	question	is	important	because	it	relates	to	the	effectiveness	of	monetary	policy:	in	other	
words,	the	possibility	of	a	malfunction	of	the	credit	channel	(or	more	specifically,	the	bank	lending	channel).	
	 Some	studies,	such	as	Stiglitz	and	Greenwald	(1992),	and	Kashyap	and	Stein	(1994)	argue	that	in	times	of	
economic	recession	or	financial	uneasiness,	since	banks	are	 less	willing	to	 take	risks	and	try	to	maintain	their	
financial	position	to	clear	the	capital	requirement,	the	ability	of	policy	authorities	to	induce	banks	to	increase	credit	
supply	would	be	very	limited.	Thus,	it	would	be	difficult	for	the	effects	of	easing	monetary	policy	to	penetrate	into	
the	whole	economy.	These	studies	 imply	that	on	one	hand,	 there	are	also	other	factors	affecting	bank	lending	
behavior	besides	monetary	policy,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	rational	behavior	of	commercial	banks	could	hinder	
the	effectiveness	of	monetary	policy.	
3.  Credit and the Propagation Mechanism of Economic Fluctuations
	 Placing	emphasis	on	the	macroeconomic	role	of	credit,	in	the	general	spirit	of	the	credit	view,	has	also	been	
done	in	order	to	explore	the	possible	links	between	credit	and	economic	fluctuations.	Two	hypotheses,	the	financial	
accelerator	hypothesis	and	 the	capital	crunch	hypothesis,	each	of	which	focuses	on	 the	changes	 in	 financial	
2　Bernanke	and	Gertler	(1995)	offer	a	detailed	illustration	of	the	balance	sheet	channel	and	the	bank	lending	channel	of	the	credit	channel	of	
monetary	transmission.
3　It	should	be	noted	that	the	term	"net	worth"	in	the	credit	view,	does	not	refer	to	the	“net	worth”	item	in	a	balance	sheet.	Instead,	it	is	a	proxy	for	
the	financial	position	or	agency	costs	of	a	borrower.	Therefore,	the	definition	and	quantification	of	it	are	somehow	ambiguous	in	the	literature.	For	
instance,	Gertler	and	Hubbard	(1988,	p.59)	state,	“Insiders’	net	worth	is,	of	course,	unobservable	in	the	data…and	use	firm	cash	flow	as	a	proxy.”	
Bernanke	and	Gertler	(1989,	p.28)	argue,	“‘Borrower	net	worth’	should	be	augmented	to	include	not	just	current	endowments,	but	also	the	‘most	
secure’	portion	of	expected	future	profits;	thus,	agency	costs	depend	not	only	on	current	wealth	but	also	on	expected	future	conditions.”	Bernanke	
and	Gertler	(1995,	p.35)	define	the	net	worth	as	the	sum	of	a	borrower’s	liquid	assets	and	marketable	collateral.	Bernanke	et al.	(1996,	p.2)	suggest	
that	a	borrower’s	net	worth	is	the	sum	of	his	internal	funds	and	the	collateral	value	of	his	illiquid	assets.	In	Bernanke	et al.	(1999,	p.1345),	the	net	
worth	is	expressed	as	a	borrower’s	liquid	assets	plus	collateral	value	of	illiquid	assets	less	outstanding	obligations.
? 13?
The	Credit	View	Revisited	––	From	the	Viewpoint	of	Bank	Lending	Behavior
position	of	borrowers	and	banks	caused	by	initial	economic	shocks,	have	been	developed	to	explain	how	these	
changes	could	amplify	and	propagate	initial	small	shocks	into	large	business	cycles.	Both	hypotheses	name	factors	
other	than	monetary	policy	that	may	explain	bank	lending	behavior.	
3.1.  The Financial Accelerator Hypothesis
	 The	essence	of	 the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	 is	 that,	with	credit	market	 imperfection,	changes	in	
borrowers’	net	worth	due	to	initial	real	shocks	will	have	a	profound	impact	on	the	whole	economy	(see	Route	2	in	
Figure	1).	On	one	hand,	negative	(positive)	shocks	decrease	(increase)	borrowers’	net	worth	and	thus	raise	(reduce)	
borrowers’	agency	costs	of	borrowing	through	the	balance	sheet	channel.	On	the	other	hand,	negative	(positive)	
macroeconomic	shocks	depress	(stimulate)	banks’	lending	willingness,	leading	to	the	“flight	to	QUALITY”	(“flight	
to	QUANTITY”)	behavior	of	banks	through	the	bank	lending	channel.	As	a	result,	borrowers’	external	financing	
costs	rise	(decline),	borrowing	constraints	become	tight	(loose),	and	thus	borrowers’	spending	and	production	are	
reduced	(expanded).	Through	 the	above	financial	chain–reaction,	 the	 initial	 small	 shocks	are	amplified	and	
propagated	to	 impede	(stimulate)	 the	whole	economy	(see	Gertler	and	Hubbard	[1988],	Bernanke	and	Gertler	
[1989,	1990],	Bernanke	et al.	[1996,	1999]	for	representative	works	on	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis).
	 The	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	has	some	important	 implications.	First,	economic	fluctuations	exert	
different	 influences	on	different	 types	of	borrowers.	Borrowers	with	weaker	financial	positions	or	more	severe	
information	asymmetries,	such	as	small	or	young	firms,	would	be	more	susceptible	to	economic	fluctuations	––	
especially	economic	downturns––	 than	 their	counterparts	––	 large	or	mature	firms.	This	 feature	 is	presented	
theoretically	by	Holmstrom	and	Tirole	(1997)	and	supported	by	a	wide	range	of	empirical	work	(see,	for	example,	
Gertler	and	Gilchrist	[1994],	and	Kashyap	et al.	[1994]).	Second,	the	financial	accelerator	effects	are	asymmetric.	
This	means	 that	 the	 impact	of	changes	 in	borrowers’	net	worth	on	 the	 real	economy	 is	more	substantial	 in	
economic	downturns	 than	 in	economic	upturns	because,	while	 there	 is	a	 lower	 limit	of	borrowers’	external	
financing	costs	––	zero	––	no	upper	limit	exists.	This	feature	is	not	only	presented	theoretically	in,	for	example,	
Gertler	and	Hubbard	(1988),	and	Bernanke	and	Gertler	(1989),	but	also	identified	empirically	by,	for	example,	
Oliner	and	Rudebusch	(1996).	Third,	considering	the	importance	of	SMEs	in	the	whole	economy,	it	is	a	matter	of	
course	that	a	disproportionate	influence	of	economic	fluctuations	on	them	may	trigger	further	economic	distress	
endogenously.	
	 It	should	be	noted	that	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	can	be	related	to	the	credit	channel	hypothesis	of	
the	monetary	transmission	mechanism.	Ashcraft	and	Campello	(2007)	conduct	an	empirical	analysis	about	whether	
the	strength	of	borrowers’	balance	sheets	influences	the	response	of	bank	lending	to	monetary	policy.	They	find	that	
the	negative	response	of	bank	lending	to	a	monetary	contraction	is	significantly	stronger	when	borrowers’	financial	
soundness	becomes	lower.	Ciccarelli	et al.	(2010)	find	empirical	evidence	that	the	credit	channel	(changes	in	the	
financial	positions	of	both	banks	and	borrowers	due	to	a	monetary	policy	shock)	significantly	amplifies	the	effect	
of	monetary	policy	on	GDP	growth	and	inflation.	
	 Up	to	the	present,	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	literature	has	focused	mainly	on	the	relationship	between	
borrowers’	balance–sheet	variables	and	their	investment	behavior,	taking	firms	as	the	object	of	analysis.	However,	
only	little	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	aspect	of	bank	lending	in	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	from	the	
micro	perspective	of	bank	behavior.	For	example,	by	matching	bank	balance–sheet	data	with	firm	balance–sheet	
data,	Jiménez	et al.	(2012a)	find	evidence	that	the	heterogeneity	in	firm	balance–sheet	strength	determine	credit	
availability	 in	both	good	and	crisis	 times	but	effects	are	even	stronger	 in	 the	latter	period.	In	other	words,	 the	
answer	 to	 the	questions	of	 if	and	how	borrowers’	financial	positions	could	significantly	affect	banks’	 lending	
behavior	are	not	clear	at	the	microeconomic	level.	Nevertheless,	this	issue	cannot	be	ignored	when	attempting	to	
ascertain	the	plausibility	of	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis.	
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3.2.  The Capital Crunch Hypothesis
	 While	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	focuses	on	changes	in	borrowers’	balance	sheet	condition	caused	
by	 initial	shocks,	 the	main	argument	of	 the	capital	crunch	hypothesis	 is	 that	changes	 in	banks’	balance	sheet	
condition	will	affect	their	lending	behavior	(see	Route	3	in	Figure	1).
	 The	deterioration	of	a	bank’s	balance	sheet	––	for	example	the	depletion	of	bank	capital	resulting	from	
declining	asset	values	or	bad	loan	problems	as	suggested	by	Stiglitz	and	Greenwald	(1992)	––	will	lower	the	bank’s	
capacity	and	willingness	to	take	risks	and	consequently	reduce	its	ability	and	willingness	to	lend.	Moreover,	it	is	
presented	 theoretically	by	Thakor	 (1996)	 that	when	a	bank’s	 level	of	capital	 is	 low,	 lending	will	be	 further	
diminished	by	the	regulatory	requirements	of	capital	adequacy,	since	the	bank	has	to	reduce	its	high–risk	category	
lending	in	order	to	clear	the	requirements.	Therefore,	banks'	weak	financial	positions	will	have	a	direct	negative	
impact	on	bank	 lending.	 In	 the	previous	 literature,	many	studies	provide	empirical	evidence	supporting	 this	
negative	correlation	(see,	for	example,	Bernanke	and	Lown	[1991],	Peek	and	Rosengren	[1995]).	
	 On	the	other	hand,	the	weak	financial	position	of	banks	will	also	impede	their	lending	ability	indirectly	by	
causing	a	decrease	 in	bank	deposits.	As	suggested	by	Kashyap	and	Stein	(1995),	considering	 the	 information	
asymmetry	between	a	bank	and	its	depositors,	 the	deterioration	of	the	bank’s	financial	position	will	 increase	its	
agency	costs	and	 lead	 to	a	decrease	 in	deposits	 (especially	when	 there	 is	a	 lack	of	deposit	 insurance).	Since	
deposits	are	a	bank’s	principal	means	of	raising	funds,	 it	 is	a	matter	of	course	that	a	decrease	in	deposits	will	
constrain	bank	lending.	
	 The	credit	crunch	hypothesis	suggests	that	banks’	balance	sheet	conditions	exert	significant	effects	on	the	
real	economy.	Bernanke	and	Gertler	(1987)	present	a	general	equilibrium	model	showing	that	the	deterioration	of	
banks’	financial	positions	will	 tighten	borrowers’	external	financing	constraints,	hinder	their	spending	and	thus	
worsen	the	situation	of	the	real	economy.	This	theoretical	prediction	is	confirmed	by	recent	empirical	studies	(see,	
for	example,	Gibson	[1995],	Hancock	and	Wilcox	[1998]).	
	 Several	implications	can	be	drawn	from	the	credit	crunch	hypothesis.	First,	the	hypothesis	suggests	there	is	
a	heterogeneity	that	cannot	be	neglected	among	banks	in	their	 lending	behavior,	since	banks	are	quite	different	
from	each	other	in	terms	of	financial	condition,	risk	capacity	and	ability	to	attract	deposits.	Second,	the	hypothesis	
implies	 that	banks	will	 show	different	patterns	of	 lending	behavior	during	economic	booms	and	economic	
recessions.	This	is	because	banks’	financial	positions	will	be	affected	differently	as	the	economy	experiences	ups	
and	downs.	The	third	implication	is	related	to	the	effect	of	liquidity	provisions	(such	as	public	funds	injection,	
central	banks’	direct	provision	of	credit	and	asset	purchases)	on	banks’	 lending	behavior.	If	 the	capital	crunch	
hypothesis	is	plausible,	it	is	expected	that	in	financial	crises,	measures	of	liquidity	provisions	to	banks	will	relax	
banks’	balance	sheet	constraints	and	thereby	stimulate	their	credit	extension.	The	last	one	is	about	the	necessity	of	
measures	introducing	a	far	greater	capital	cushion	into	financial	 institutions	and	the	macroeconomic	impact	of	
regulatory	policies	having	to	do	with	banks’	balance	sheet	conditions	such	as	minimum	capital	requirements.	While	
these	measures	and	regulations	do	play	a	positive	role	 in	preventing	financial	uneasiness	from	occurring	and	
promoting	banks’	financial	health,	it	cannot	be	denied	that	during	economic	downturns	and	financial	crises,	they	
could	aggravate	the	macroeconomic	situation	by	imposing	external	constraints	on	bank	lending	and	thus	reinforce	
the	“pro-cyclical”	nature	of	financial	intermediation.	
	 It	is	noteworthy	that	just	like	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis	is	not	isolated	in	the	credit	view,	the	credit	
crunch	hypothesis	is	relevant	to	the	credit	channel	hypothesis	of	the	monetary	transmission	mechanism.	Kashyap	
and	Stein	(1994)	and	Thakor	(1996)	suggest	that	the	capital	constraint	of	banks	will	impede	the	effectiveness	of	the	
lending	channel	of	monetary	easing	policy	by	constraining	banks’	credit	extension.	Gambacorta	(2005)	shows	that	
the	impact	of	monetary	tightening	on	reducing	bank	lending	is	weaker	for	well–capitalized	banks.	
	 The	credit	crunch	hypothesis	can	also	be	related	to	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis.	Gertler	and	Kiyotaki	
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(2011)	develop	a	DSGE	(Dynamic	Stochastic	General	Equilibrium)	model	which	 incorporates	balance–sheet	
constraints	on	financial	institutions,	suggesting	that	disruptions	in	financial	intermediation	due	to	weak	financial	
condition	of	financial	 institutions	will	significantly	amplify	a	recession.	Ciccarelli	et al.	 (2010)	find	empirical	
evidence	that	during	a	financial	crisis,	a	reduction	of	credit	supply	to	firms	will	significantly	contribute	to	the	
decline	in	GDP	growth,	which	means	that	a	credit	crunch	can	lead	to	the	further	deterioration	of	the	real	economy.	
Jiménez	et al.	(2012a)	analyze	the	impact	of	bank	balance	sheet	strength	on	loan	granting,	and	find	that	weakness	
in	banks’	financial	condition	(such	as	capital	and	liquidity)	reduces	the	supply	of	bank	credit	in	crisis	times.	After	
identifying	 the	effects	of	monetary	policy	on	 loan	supply	and	 loan	demand,	Jiménez	et al.	 (2012b)	present	
empirical	results	 that	both	tighter	monetary	and	worse	economic	conditions	substantially	reduce	loan	granting,	
especially	from	banks	with	lower	capital	or	liquidity	ratios.		
4.  A Model: A Theoretical Examination of the Credit View from Bank Behavior
	 As	mentioned	in	the	above	sections,	it	is	emphasized	in	the	credit	view	that	the	essential	difference	between	
banks	and	other	financial	institutions	is	that	banks	tackle	financial	market	imperfections	through	their	information–
acquiring	activities.	Based	on	this	special	activity	performed	by	banks,	I	examine	in	this	section	the	hypotheses	of	
the	credit	view	theoretically	from	the	perspective	of	bank	lending	behavior,	by	presenting	a	bank	model	in	which	
information–acquiring	costs	––	i.e.,	the	costs	stemming	from	information–related	activities	––	are	incorporated.	
	 There	are	two	types	of	agents	in	the	model,	an	entrepreneur	and	a	bank.	The	detailed	assumptions	for	each	
are	stated	as	follows:
(1)		The	Entrepreneur
	 Investment project:	The	investment	project	of	the	entrepreneur	is	a	one–period	project.	If	the	entrepreneur	
makes	normal	(average–level)	efforts,	the	possibility	of	success	of	the	project	is	ps,	while	the	possibility	of	failure	is	
pf	(ps >	pf	).	However,	the	diligent	expense	of	effort	entails	disutility	in	the	form	of	physical	and	mental	pains,	loss	
of	 leisure	 time,	etc.	Therefore,	without	 the	monitoring	of	outsiders,	 the	entrepreneur	has	an	 incentive	 to	be	
negligent	in	making	average–level	efforts.	Furthermore,	the	expected	returns	from	the	project	will	be	zero	if	the	
project	ends	in	failure.
	 Endowments:	At	the	beginning	of	the	period,	the	entrepreneur	has	an	endowment	of	some	internal	funds	(IF),	
and	some	fixed	assets,	which	are	assumed	 to	be	 lands	 (LA)	 for	 the	sake	of	simplicity.	Let	 the	subscript	“0”	
designate	“the	beginning	of	the	period”,	and	the	subscript	“1”	designate	“the	end	of	the	period”.	Assuming	the	land	
price	at	 the	beginning	of	the	period	is	p0
L,	 the	total	market	value	(collateral	value)	of	the	lands	is	p0
L･LA	at	 the	
beginning	of	the	period,	then	the	entrepreneur’s	net	worth	(NW)	can	be	expressed	as	the	sum	of	internal	funds	and	
the	collateral	value	of	fixed	assets:
	 	 	 NW	=	IF	+	p0
L･LA      	 (1)
	 Demand for Borrowing:	Since	the	investment	capital	needed	by	the	investment	project	is	larger	than	the	
amount	of	the	entrepreneur’s	internal	funds,	it	is	necessary	for	the	entrepreneur	to	borrow	from	a	bank	to	finance	
the	project.	
	 If	a	bank	is	willing	to	lend	to	the	entrepreneur,	at	the	beginning	of	the	period,	a	debt	contract	for	one	period	
is	made	between	them,	and	the	entrepreneur	starts	 the	project	with	the	funds	from	the	bank.	At	 the	end	of	 the	
period,	the	project	is	over,	and	the	debt	contract	is	finished.
	 Limited Liability:	The	entrepreneur	has	limited	liability:	that	is	to	say,	the	bank	has	no	claim	on	any	asset	of	
the	entrepreneur	other	than	the	project	returns	and	collateral.
(2)		The	Bank
	 The Balance–Sheet Constraint:	For	simplicity,	the	bank	is	assumed	to	have	only	two	categories	of	assets:	
loans	and	reserves,	and	one	category	of	liabilities:	deposits.	
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	 At	the	beginning	of	the	period,	 just	before	the	bank	lends	to	the	entrepreneur,	 the	bank’s	balance–sheet	
constraint	is:
	 	 	 AS	=	R0	=	D0	+	C0		(R0	>	qD0),	 	 	 	 	 (2)
where	AS	is	total	assets	of	the	bank,	R0	is	bank	reserves	(including	extra	reserves),	D0	is	deposits	of	the	bank,	C0	is	
bank	capital,	and	q	(0 <	q <	1)	is	the	required	reserve	ratio.	
	 If	the	bank	lends	the	amount	L	to	the	entrepreneur,	then	at	the	end	of	the	period,	just	before	the	entrepreneur	
repays	the	debt,	the	bank’s	balance–sheet	constraint	is:
	 	 	 R1	+	L	=	D1	+	C1		(R1 ≧ qD1),	 	 	 	 	 (3)
and
	 	 	 D1	=	D0	+	kL,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4)
where	k	(0	<	k <	1)	is	assumed	to	be	the	remaining	deposit	ratio.
	 Equation	(4)	shows	that	the	deposits	at	the	end	of	the	period	are	the	sum	of	the	deposits	at	the	beginning	of	
the	period	and	the	amount	of	loans	flowing	into	the	bank	in	the	form	of	deposits	during	the	period.	
	 The Problem of Asymmetric Information:	Using	past	experience	and	expert	know–how,	the	bank	can	estimate	
the	project’s	possibilities	of	success	and	failure	under	the	average–level	efforts.	However,	the	bank	doesn’t	know	
how	much	effort	that	the	entrepreneur	would	indeed	make.	This	is	the	asymmetric	information	problem	I	assume	
there	to	be	between	the	entrepreneur	and	the	bank4.
	 Collateral Requirement:	When	lending	to	the	entrepreneur,	 the	bank	requires	the	land	possessed	by	the	
entrepreneur	 to	be	put	up	as	collateral	 in	order	 to	ameliorate	 the	problem	of	asymmetric	 information,	and	 to	
provide	protection	from	the	insolvency	of	the	entrepreneur.	At	the	beginning	of	the	period,	the	bank’s	expectation	
about	the	total	market	value	of	the	land	at	the	end	of	the	period	is	E	[p1
L･LA].
	 In	the	case	of	limited	liability,	if	the	project	fails	the	pledged	land	will	be	confiscated	by	the	bank	since	the	
project	returns	are	then	zero.
	 Information–Acquiring Activities:	Another	action	taken	by	the	bank	to	mitigate	the	information	problem	is	
conducting	 information–acquiring	 activities	 concerning	 the	 entrepreneur,	 such	 as	 investigating	 his	
creditworthiness,	 evaluating	 the	profitability	of	 the	project,	monitoring	 the	 level	of	efforts	exerted	by	 the	
entrepreneur,	and	confirming	 the	development	of	 the	project.	 I	 assume	 that	with	 such	 information–related	
activities,	the	entrepreneur	would	expend	at	least	average–level	efforts.	
	 Information–acquiring	activities	are	costly,	however,	and	the	costs	of	such	activities	––	let	us	call	 them	
information–acquiring	costs	(IC)	––	are	too	high	to	be	ignored.	IC	is	assumed	to	be	determined	by	three	variables:	
the	amount	of	the	loan	(L),	the	total	assets	of	the	bank	at	the	beginning	of	the	period	(AS),	and	the	net	worth	of	the	
entrepreneur	at	the	beginning	of	the	period	(NW).	
	 As	L	becomes	larger,	the	intensity	of	the	bank’s	information–acquiring	activities	will	 increase	and	at	the	
same	time	the	bank’s	incentive	to	monitor	the	entrepreneur	will	be	stronger	because	the	bank	will	suffer	a	larger	
loss	if	the	project	fails.	Both	of	these	will	induce	more	costs	(not	only	the	pecuniary	costs	but	also	non–pecuniary	
costs)	in	connection	with	the	information–acquiring	activities.	I	also	assume	that	as	AS	becomes	larger,	IC	will	
decrease	due	to	the	economics	of	scale.	As	we	know,	large	banks	often	have	extensive	branch	networks,	allowing	
them	get	more	correct	information	more	easily.	Furthermore,	as	mentioned	in	Section	3.1.,	high	NW	will	mitigate	
information	asymmetries	between	the	bank	and	the	entrepreneur,	reduce	the	entrepreneur’s	agency	costs	associated	
with	borrowing,	and	thus	lead	to	a	decrease	in	IC.	For	these	reasons,	
4　In	the	literature,	the	problem	of	asymmetric	information	has	been	captured	from	various	aspects.	For	example,	in	Stiglitz	and	Weiss	(1981),	
only	entrepreneurs	know	about	the	riskiness	of	their	projects;	in	Gertler	and	Hubbard	(1988),	entrepreneurs	have	private	information	about	how	
investment	funds	are	used;	and	in	Bernanke	and	Gertler	(1989),	“costly	state	verification	(CVS)”	problem	(it	is	costly	for	outsiders	to	observe	the	
realized	outcome	of	entrepreneurs’	investment	projects)	is	assumed.
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IC	=	f	(L
+
,	A
-
S,	N
-
W)
where	the	IC	function	is	twice	continuously	differentiable,	and	
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂2IC　　　 ∂2IC　　　 ∂2IC
　　  ＞ 0,	　　  ＜ 0,	　　  ＜ 0
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 ∂2L　　　 ∂2AS　　　∂2NW
	 The	specific	form	of	the	IC	function	is	assumed	as:
	 	 	 IC	=	a1L
2	–	a2AS
2	–	a3NW
2,	 	 	 	 	 	 (5)
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　a2AS
2	+	a3NW
2
where	a1	>	0,	a2	>	0,	a3	>	0,	and		a1	>		　　　　　　　　
5
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　L2
	 The Loan Rate and the Deposit Rate:	To	keep	things	as	simple	as	possible,	it	is	assumed	that	the	loan	market	
and	deposit	market	are	highly	competitive	and	both	the	entrepreneur	and	the	bank	are	price	takers.	Hence,	with	the	
given	loan	rate	(rL)	and	deposit	rate	(rD),	the	bank	and	the	entrepreneur	make	their	decisions	concerning	loan	supply	
and	loan	demand.
	 The Interest Rate on Safe Assets:	The	riskless	 interest	 rate	 (r),	a	proxy	for	monetary	policy,	 is	given	
exogenously.	As	a	result,	 the	opportunity	costs	of	the	bank’s	lending	to	the	entrepreneur	––	in	other	words,	 the	
return	from	investing	the	same	amount	as	L	in	safe	assets	––	is	(1+r)L.
	 Based	on	the	above	set	of	assumptions,	I	describe	the bank’s incentive–compatible constraint	as	follows:	
	 	 	 ps	(1	+	rL)	L	+	p
f E	[p1
L･LA]	–	IC ≧ (1	+	r)	L	 	 	 	 (6)
	 The	left–hand	side	of	(6)	shows	the	bank’s	expected	return	from	lending,	which	is	the	expected	return	of	the	
project	(the	sum	of	the	expected	return	if	 the	project	succeeds	and	if	 the	project	fails)	minus	the	information–
acquiring	costs.	The	 right–hand	side	 is	 the	opportunity	costs	 that	 the	bank	 incurs	when	making	 loans.	This	
inequality	shows	 that	 the	bank	has	 the	 incentive	 to	bear	 information–acquiring	costs	 in	order	 to	 lend	 to	 the	
entrepreneur	only	when	the	expected	return	from	lending	is	no	less	than	the	opportunity	costs	of	lending.	
	 The	profit	function	of	the	bank	can	be	expressed	simply	as	subtracting	the	interest	costs	paid	for	deposits	
(rDD1)	and	the	information–acquiring	costs	(IC)	from	the	interest	income	of	loans	(rLL):
	 	 	 Π	=	rLL	–	rDD1	–	IC		 	 	 	 	 	 (7)
	 It	is	assumed	that	the	bank	chooses	L	to	maximize	(7)	subject	to	(1),	(2),	(4),	(5)	and	(6).
	 The	maximization	problem	can	be	stated	as	the	following	Lagrangian	function	Ф,	with	Lagrangian	multiplier	
λ	associated	with	the	bank’s	incentive–compatible	constraint.	
	 	 	 Ф	=	rLL	–	rDD1	–	IC	+	λ	{[p
s	(1	+	rL)	L	+	p
f E	[p1
L･LA]	–	IC]	–	(1	+	r)	L}	 (8)
	 Choosing	L	to	maximize	the	profit	results	in	the	two	first–order	conditions:
	∂Ф
　　 =	rL	–	rD k	–	2a1L	+	λ	[p
s	(1	+	rL)	–	2a1L	–	(1	+	r)]	=	0	 	 	 	 	 (9) ∂L
	∂Ф
　　 ={ps	(1	+	rL)	L	+	p
f E	[P1
L･LA]	–	IC}	–	(1	+	r)	L	≥	0,	λ	≥	0		with	complementary	slackness	 (10)
	∂L
when	the	bank’s	incentive–compatible	constraint	is	not	binding	––	i.e.	the	bank’s	expected	return	from	lending	is	
always	larger	than	that	from	investment	in	riskless	assets,	λ=0.	In	this	situation,	 the	level	of	L	can	be	obtained	
directly	from	(9).	For	λ>0,	we	can	solve	for	L	directly	from	(10).
	 Solving	L	is	not	the	main	purpose	of	the	model.	Instead,	the	most	important	results	obtained	from	the	model	
are	the	following	relations,	when	the	bank’s	lending	behavior	is	constrained	by	a	binding	incentive–	compatible	
constraint6:
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 a2AS
2	+	a3NW
2
5　In	order	to	guarantee	that	IC	is	larger	than	zero,	it	is	assumed	that		a1	>	　　　　　　 .
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　L2
6　To	see	the	denominator	(1	+	r)	–	ps	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L	is	positive,	note	that	from	(3)	and	(9),
　　　　　　　　L	[(1	+	r)	–	ps	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L]	=	p
f E	[p1
L･LA]	+	a2AS
2	+	a3NW
2	>	0
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		∂L　　　　 2a2	(D0	+	C0)　　	=	　　　　　　　　　　　 	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 (11)
	∂D0　  (1	+	r)	–	p
s	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L
		∂L　　　　 2a2	(D0	+	C0)　　	=	　　　　　　　　　　　 	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 (12)
	∂C0　  (1	+	r)	–	p
s	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L
		∂L　　　  2a3	(IF	+	P0
L･LA)
　　	=	　　　　　　　　　　　 	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 (13)
	∂IF　  (1	+	r)	–	ps	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L
						∂L　　　　 2a3	(IF	+	P0
L･LA)
　　　　	=	　　　　　　　　　　　 	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 (14)
	∂P0
L･LA　  (1	+	r)	–	ps	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L
										∂L　　　　　　　　pf
　　　　　 	=	　　　　　　　　　　　 	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 (15)
	∂E	[P0
L･LA]　  (1	+	r)	–	ps	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L
		∂L　　　　　　  L
　　	=	　　　　　　　　　　　 	>	0		 	 	 	 	 	 (16)
		∂r　　(1	+	r)	–	ps	(1	+	rL)	+	2a1L
	 To	speak	specifically,	ceteris paribus,	the	above	formulas	imply	the	following	relations,	which	support	the	
credit	view	theoretically	from	the	viewpoint	of	bank	lending	behavior:	
(i)	(11)	predicts	that	an	increase	in	the	bank’s	deposits	at	the	beginning	of	the	period	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	
the	bank’s	lending	to	the	entrepreneur.	
(ii)	(12)	predicts	that	an	increase	in	the	bank’s	capital	at	the	beginning	of	the	period	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	
bank’s	lending	to	the	entrepreneur.	The	result	is	consistent	with	the	credit	crunch	hypothesis.
(iii)	(13),	(14)	and	(15)	predict	that	an	increase	in	the	entrepreneur’s	internal	funds,	collateral	values	and	the	bank’s	
expectation	at	the	beginning	of	period	of	the	entrepreneur’s	end–period	collateral	values	would	lead	to	an	increase	
in	the	bank’s	lending	to	the	entrepreneur.	Since	these	3	variables	are	determinants	of	the	borrower’s	net	worth	and	
agency	costs	 in	 this	model,	 this	result	 is	consistent	with	 the	bank	lending	channel	of	 the	financial	accelerator	
hypothesis.
(iv)	(16)	predicts	 that	an	 increase	 in	 the	riskless	 interest	 rate	would	 lead	 to	a	decrease	 in	bank	lending	to	 the	
entrepreneur.	This	result	 implies	that	monetary	shocks	would	cause	changes	in	bank	lending	behavior,	which	is	
consistent	with	the	credit	channel	hypothesis	of	the	monetary	transmission	mechanism.
5.  Conclusions
	 As	noted	by	Boivin	et al.	(2011),	“the	role	of	non–neoclassical	channels	in	our	understanding	of	economic	
fluctuations	and	monetary	policy”	is	one	of	“extremely	important	outstanding	questions	for	research.”
	 In	the	first	part	of	the	paper,	focusing	on	the	credit	channel	hypothesis,	the	financial	accelerator	hypothesis,	
and	the	capital	crunch	hypothesis,	I	review	the	literature	of	 the	credit	view	and	sketch	the	general	outline	and	
implications	of	the	credit	view.	I	also	raise	several	issues	in	the	credit	view	calling	for	clarification	from	the	micro–
perspective	of	bank	lending	behavior.
	 Taking	these	issues	into	consideration,	in	the	second	part	of	the	paper,	I	develop	a	bank	behavior	model	using	
a	different	strategy	from	that	of	previous	 literature:	 focusing	on	bank	lending	behavior,	 instead	of	 looking	at	
borrower	investment,	employment	or	production	behavior.
	 The	special	feature	of	the	model	is	that	information–acquiring	costs	are	incorporated.	The	model	predicts	that	
such	factors	as	the	balance–sheet	condition	of	the	bank	(bank	deposits	and	bank	capital),	balance–sheet	condition	
of	the	borrower	(internal	funds	and	the	collateral	value	of	fixed	assets),	and	monetary	policy	will	work	together	to	
affect	bank	 lending	behavior.	The	results	of	 the	model	are	consistent	with	 the	hypotheses	of	 the	credit	view,	
supporting	the	credit	view	theoretically	from	the	bank	side.	
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Figure 1   A Schematic Diagram of the Credit View
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